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NOTES
FIRE AT WILL: THE CIA DIRECTOR'S
ABILITY TO DISMISS HOMOSEXUAL
EMPLOYEES AS NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS
In the mid-1970's, the media contained many allegations of
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA" or "Agency") misconduct.' As
a result of the charges in the media, as well as numerous congres-
sional investigations into CIA conduct, Congress increased the
amount of oversight it exercised over the conduct of Agency busi-
ness.2
 Congress eventually codified the terms of the increased ov-
ersight in the Intelligence and Oversight Act of 1980, which re-
quires the CIA Director to keep congressional oversight committees
"fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities."3
 The
I
 TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE, ABA STANDING COMMITTEE
ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY, OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES: AN EVALUATION I (1985) [hereinafter TAsk FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER
INTELLIGENCE].
2 Id.
3
 In the pertinent part, the Intelligence and Oversight Act of 1980 provides:
(a) Reports to Congressional Committees of current and proposed activities
To the extent consistent with all applicable authorities and duties, including
those conferred by the Constitution upon the executive and legislative branches
of the Government, and to the extent consistent with due regard for the pro-
tection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information and information
relating to intelligence sources and methods, the Director of Central Intelligence
and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United
States involved in intelligence activities shall —
(1) keep the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (here-
inafter in this section referred to as the "intelligence committees") fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities which are the responsibility of,
arc engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department,
agency, or entity of the United States, including any significant anticipated
intelligence activity, except that (A) the foregoing provision shall not require
approval of the intelligence committees as a condition precedent to the initiation
of any such anticipated intelligence activity, and (B) if the President determines
it is essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting
vital interests of the United States, such notice shall he limited to the chairman
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activities about which the CIA Director must inform Congress in-
clude all CIA covert action operations. 4
The one area, however, in which Congress has not exercised
any control over the CIA Director's actions is Agency employment
policies. Section 102(c) of the National Security Act permits the CIA
Director to dismiss any employee when the Director deems that
employee's dismissal "necessary or advisable in the interest of the
United States." 5 When exercising the discretion permitted under
this section of the National Security Act, the CIA Director "deems"
homosexuals security risks and dismisses them from the Agency. 6
Because Congress chose not to focus their attention on the
CIA's discriminatory employment policies when it formulated its
most recent oversight legislation for the CIA, a homosexual em-
ployee dismissed by the Agency cannot rely on this legislation for
any assistance. Rather, a homosexual dismissed by the CIA must
look to the courts for redress of the Agency's discrimination. In a
lawsuit against the CIA, a dismissed homosexual employee can
and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and
minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate;
(2) furnish any information or material concerning intelligence activities
which is in the possession, custody, or control of any department, agency, or
entity of the United States and which is requested by either of the intelligence
committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities; and
(3) report in a timely fashion to the intelligence committees any illegal
intelligence activity or significant intelligence failure and any corrective action
that has been taken or is planned to be taken in connection with such illegal
activity or failure.
50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982).
4 TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE, supra note 1 at 12.
5 In the pertinent part, the National Security Act of 1947 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 652 of Title 5, or the provisions
of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion,
terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever
he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the
United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or
employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of
the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States
Civil Service Commission.
50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1982).
6 See Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2049 (1988) (the CIA fired a covert electronics
technician after he disclosed his homosexuality); see also D. PHILLIPS, SECRET OPERATIONS:
How TO BE A FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE OFFicEtt (1984). When discussing the qualifications to
become a CIA agent, Phillips stated that "[h]omosexuals continue to be considered security
risks in most intelligence agencies and are not hired if homosexual tendencies are spotted
during security reviews."
Id. at 74.
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allege several causes of action. One cause of action a homosexual
employee may allege is that his or her dismissal from the Agency
violates one of the employment protection statutes previously en-
acted by Congress to protect federal government employees from
arbitrary dismissal.' Additionally, a homosexual employee could
challenge his or her dismissal from the CIA by alleging that the
Director's actions violated the employee's rights under the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 8
The CIA Director can successfully defend against a homosexual
plaintiff's lawsuit brought pursuant to one of the federal employ-
ment protection statutes. In past decisions, federal courts have held
that these statutes do not apply to the CIA. 9
 Recently, the United
States Supreme Court put the matter to rest by stating that the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") does not restrict the CIA
Director's discretion to dismiss employees under section 102(c) of
the National Security Act."
Along with the statutory claims, homosexual plaintiffs can al-
lege that their dismissal from the CIA violated their fifth amend-
ment constitutional rights to either due process or equal protec-
tion." In such a suit, a homosexual plaintiff can contend that the
right of privacy includes homosexual conduct, that private homo-
sexual conduct is a fundamental right, or that homosexuals consti-
tute a suspect class.' 2
 If the court agrees with any of these conten-
7 See, e.g„ Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1982); Veteran's Preference
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 815-69 (1958) (current version at 5 U.S.C. I§ 2108, 3305(b), 3311-16, 3351,
3363, 7701 (1982)); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §1 7501-04, 7511 - 14 (1982).
"See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988) (homosexual
plaintiff alleged that his discharge from the Army violated his fifth amendment right to
equal protection), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); Beller v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 1980) (homosexual, plaintiff alleged his discharge from the Navy
violated his fifth amendment right to due process), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
9 See, e.g., Neely v. CIA, 27 FEP Cases 82, 85 (D.D.C. 1982) (court stated that the CSRA
did subject the CIA to the protections offered by the Act), aff'd, 744 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985); Rhodes v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 31, 36 (1962)
(court stated that neither the VPA nor the CSA limits the CIA director's authority under
section 102(c)).
'° See Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053 (Court held that the APA does not apply to CIA
employment decisions).
" See, e.g., Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1335 (homosexual plaintiff alleged that his discharge
from the Army violated his fifth amendment right to equal protection); Beller, 632 F.2d at
807 (homosexual plaintiff alleged his discharge from the Navy violated his fifth amendment
right to clue process). Although the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
contains no equal protection clause, government discrimination can still violate the fifth
amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).
n See Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1345. In order to be a suspect class, a group must be the
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tions, then the court will review the homosexual plaintiff's
constitutional claim under the strict scrutiny standard." Using this
standard, in order for the court to rule that the Agency's dismissal
of the homosexual employee was constitutional, the CIA's actions
must be necessary to further a compelling state interest." If, how-
ever, the court does not agree with any of the homosexual employ-
ee's contentions, then the court will use the lowest standard of
constitutional review when deciding the constitutionality of the
Agency's action. Under this standard, in order for the court to
declare the dismissal constitutional, the Agency's dismissal of a hom-
osexual employee only needs to be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest."
When a homosexual employee uses these constitutional claims
to challenge his or her dismissal from the Agency, the CIA Director
has two types of defenses available. First, the CIA Director can
challenge the homosexual plaintiff's contentions regarding the clas-
sification of homosexual conduct as a fundamental right or the
classification of homosexuals as a suspect class, and assert that the
court should not review the Agency's dismissal of a homosexual
employee under a heightened scrutiny standard. In at least one
circuit and the United States Supreme Court, courts have agreed
with the arguments that a court should not review discrimination
against homosexuals under a heightened scrutiny standard, either
because homosexuals are not a suspect class or because homosexual
conduct does not merit inclusion in the right of privacy." If a court
agrees with the CIA Director that a homosexual employee's claims
do not merit any heightened scrutiny, then the CIA Director need
only demonstrate that the dismissal of a homosexual passes the
lowest level of constitutional scrutiny. The CIA Director should be
subject of historical discrimination, the discrimination must be unfair, and the group must
lack political power. Id. at 1345-48.
' 5 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Court used strict scrutiny to review a
statute that infringed upon the fundamental right to marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (Court used strict scrutiny to review a statute that infringed
upon the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (regulation that discriminates against a suspect class receives strict
scrutiny).
14 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
IS See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 611 (1960); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 116-2 (2d ed. 1988).
'" See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (Court held that the right to privacy
does not include homosexual conduct); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(court stated that homosexuals do not comprise a suspect class).
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able to do this because the federal courts have traditionally accepted
arguments advanced by the federal government that homosexuals
detract from the efficiency of the agency that employs them.' 7
If a court agrees with the homosexual plaintiff's contentions
that either private homosexual conduct represents a fundamental
right or homosexuals comprise a suspect class, then the court will
review the employee's dismissal under a heightened scrutiny stan-
dard.' 8 In this situation, the CIA Director must resort to the second
level of defense against a homosexual employee's constitutional
claims. The CIA Director must argue that the dismissal of homo-
sexual employees is necessary to accomplish a compelling state in-
terest. The circuits are split as to whether the dismissal of homo-
sexual employees in the intelligence gathering agencies is in fact
necessary to protect the national security, because homosexuals rep-
resent security risks.'' Thus, the CIA Director can challenge a hom-
osexual employee's constitutional claims on two levels.
Another possible defense that the CIA Director may use against
a homosexual plaintiff's claims involves arguing that the CIA's em-
ployment decisions are the type of cases that courts traditionally
decline to review. 2° Under this argument, the court would not even
consider the constitutional claims, but rather would decline to hear
the case entirely. Although it is not a majority position, this argu-
ment has support on the United States Supreme Court. 21 Thus, in
a lawsuit brought by a dismissed homosexual employee, the CIA
Director may defend against both the plaintiff's statutory and con-
17 See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court noted that
homosexuality evidenced an unstable personality unsuited for certain kinds of work); Dew
v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (court deferred to agency opinion which held
that homosexuality demonstrated a lack of character, stability, and responsibility), cert. dis-
missed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
18 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Court used strict scrutiny to review a
statute that infringed upon the fundamental right to marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (Court used strict scrutiny to review a statute that infringed
upon the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (regulation that discriminates against a suspect class receives strict
scrutiny).
' 9 See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1350-52 (9th Cir. 1988) (court stated that
Army's regulations requiring the service to discharge homosexuals are too loosely tailored to
further a compelling state interest), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); Beller
v, Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980) (court states that Navy regulations requiring
the service to discharge homosexuals have a close relationship to an important federal
government interest), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
20 See infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the types of cases
that courts traditionally decline to review.
41 See Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2059 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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stitutional claims, or argue that the case is the type which the court
should not hear at all. Therefore, the CIA Director has at least
three levels of defenses that he or she may use to defeat the con-
stitutional and statutory claims brought by a homosexual defendant.
The courts have apparently closed the door on any hopes a
homosexual plaintiff might have of making a successful statutory
challenge to his or her dismissal from the CIA under section 102(c).
Additionally, all indications are that the CIA Director will be suc-
cessful with at least one of his constitutional arguments, which will
be enough to defeat a homosexual plaintiff's constitutional claims.
In the courts, homosexuals have little chance of succesfully chal-
lenging their dismissal by the federal government. 22
 On more than
one occasion, the courts have revealed their animosity toward hom-
osexuals by using stereotypes and flawed logic to defeat homosex-
ual's claims. 25
Concurrently, the courts have revealed their admiration for the
intelligence agencies. Courts have broadly interpreted employment
protection statutes in order to exempt the CIA Director's employ-
ment decisions from coverage. 24 Additionally, the courts have rec-
ognized the protection of national security information available to
CIA employees as a compelling state interest. 25
 Moreover, the courts
have deferred to the judgment of the intelligence agencies that their
actions are necessary to protect this compelling state interest. 26
2.2
 R. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW (1988). When analyz-
ing a homosexual's chance of success in challenging the government, Mohr noted:
The typical judicial strategy is now to say, even in national security cases, that
homosexuality is not per se a bar to some opportunity for a gay litigant (say
custody or a security clearance), but then, in the end, to find the litigant's
homosexuality fully dispositive anyway—even going so far as to pose dilemmas
with no escape for the gay litigant.
Id. at 210.
" See infra notes 278-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hawed logic
used by courts in their constitutional analysis of a homosexual litigant's claim.
24
 See infra notes 261-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the broad interpre-
tation given by the Supreme Court to the APA's exemptions in order to shield the CIA from
judicial review under the APA.
25 See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980)) (Court held that protecting the secrecy of important national
security information represents a compelling state interest); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507, 509 n.3 (1980) (Court held that the government has a compelling interest in protecting
the secrecy of national security information).
26
 See, e.g., Sims, 471 U.S. at 179 (Court noted that the CIA Director was familiar with
the "whole picture" while judges are not); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d
908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980) (court noted that the executive has unparalleled expertise in foreign
policy while the judiciary lacks expertise in that area), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
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Thus, when defending against a homosexual plaintiff's constitu-
tional claims, any or all of the arguments advanced by the CIA
Director have a good chance of success because of courts' low regard
for homosexuals and high regard for the intelligence agencies.
This note analyzes the deference given to the CIA Director by
the courts, allowing him or her to fire homosexual employees as
national security risks. Section I provides an overview of the types
of government actions that the courts have traditionally declined to
review. 27
 Section II examines the CIA Director's possible defenses
when a homosexual employee challenges his or her dismissal in
court." Section II discusses the statutory and constitutional claims
that a homosexual could bring against the Agency as a result of an
adverse employment decision. 29
 Section II also examines the com-
pelling state interest represented by the protection of sensitive na-
tional security information in the possession of the CIA. 3° Section
III analyzes how the courts' attitudes toward both the CIA and
homosexuals inevitably lead to the CIA's victory in employment
discrimination cases brought by homosexuals. 3 '
1. OVERVIEW OF THE TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has declined to
review actions undertaken by either the executive or legislative
branches of the federal government pursuant to powers granted to
them in the United States Constitution. 32
 The Court has declined
to review such actions because it stated that a specific grant of power
in the Constitution excludes the judiciary from exercising authority
in that arena." Additionally, the Court has stated that it lacks suf-
ficient expertise to decide on the wisdom of actions taken by the
27
 See infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
w See infra notes 44-249 and accompanying text.
3° See infra notes 49-190 and accompanying text.
3° See infra notes 191-244 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 250-329 and accompanying text.
" See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,10 (1973); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,554
(1946). Traditionally, courts have also declined to review other types of government action,
but these situations are beyond the scope of this note. See Redish, Judicial Review and the
"Political Question," 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031 (1985) for a discussion of the "Political Question"
doctrine, under which some courts hold that some questions are non-justiciable because they
present issues of constitutional law that the political branches of the government can resolve
more effectively.
89 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554,
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other branches when operating in their assigned spheres. 34 Thus,
when exercising a power granted to them by the Constitution, the
executive and legislature traditionally operate without judicial ov-
ersight.
The United States Supreme Court has held that it is inappro-
priate to act in an area that the Constitution assigns to another
branch of the federal government. It has also ruled that courts lack
the requisite expertise to make judgments in these areas. In the
1973 case of Gilligan v. Morgan, the United States Supreme Court
declined to review the regulations governing the Ohio National
Guard both because the Constitution assigned this function to the
legislature and because the courts have no competency to review
such matters. 35 In Gilligan, several full-time students and officers of
the student government at Kent State University in Ohio alleged
that in May of 1970, the National Guard violated students rights of
free speech and assembly during a period of civil unrest on and
around the campus. 36 As relief, the students asked the Gilligan Court
to assume what amounted to regulatory jurisdiction over the Ohio
National Guard."
The Gilligan Court stated that article one, section eight, clause
sixteen of the United States Constitution explicitly assigns to Con-
gress the responsibility of organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia, now the national guard. 38 The Gilligan Court also noted that
control of the military requires complex and professional decision
making." With regard to the control of the military, the Gilligan
Court stated that it is "difficult to conceive of an area of government
in which the courts have less competence." 4° Through its decision
not to review the training and mission of the Ohio National Guard,
31 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10.
"Id. at 11-12.
" Id. at 3.
37
 Id. at 5.
5' Id. at 6; see also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946). In Colegrove, three
voters residing in Illinois congressional districts with much larger populations than the other
Illinois districts brought suit against the Illinois Governor and Secretary of State to restrain
an election because Illinois congressional districts lacked the compactness of territory and
equality of population mandated by the Reapportionment Act of 1911. Colegrove, 328 U.S.
at 550. The United States Supreme Court noted that article one, section eight of the United
States Constitution gives Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the
states in the House of Representatives. /d. at 554. As a result, the Court concluded that when
Congress fails to ensure that a state contains proportional districts, the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution excludes the judiciary from entering the situation. Id.
39 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10.
401d.
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the Gilligan Court demonstrated that the judiciary believes it lacks
sufficient expertise to make decisions in areas in which the Consti-
tution designates another branch as the preeminent authority.
Therefore, when the United States Constitution grants author-
ity to a branch of the federal government other than the judiciary,
the courts decline to review the actions taken by the branch in the
exercise of this power.'" The courts refuse to review these actions
both because the court believes it lacks the expertise to judge the
wisdom of the action, and because a constitutional grant of power
to a specific branch excludes the judiciary from acting in this area. 42
As a result, the courts traditionally refuse to review the actions of
another branch of the federal government when that branch acts
pursuant to a constitutional grant of power. 45
11. DISCUSSION OF THE CIA DIRECTOR'S POTENTIAL DEFENSES
AGAINST CLAIMS BY DISMISSED HOMOSEXUAL EMPLOYEES
Because Congress has not included CIA employment practices
as one of the Agency activities that it supervises, a homosexual
employee dismissed by the Agency as a result of his or her sexual
orientation must use the courts to obtain a remedy against the
Agency. In the lawsuit against the CIA, a homosexual employee
may allege that the dismissal was a violation of a federal employment
protection statute," a violation of the employee's constitutional
rights,45
 or a violation of the employee's both statutory and consti-
tutional rights. 46
41 See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Colegrove v, Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946).
42 See, e.g., Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10; Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554.
48
 See, e.g., Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 6; Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554. See also Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). The United States Supreme Court held in Oetjen that
the United States Constitution commits the conduct of the foreign relations of our govern-
ment to the Executive and the Legislature. Id. at 302.
" See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S,C, §§ 701-06 (1982); Veteran's Prefer-
ence Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 815-69 (1958) (current version at 5 U.S.C. II 2108, 3305(b), 3311-16,
3351, 3363, 7701 (1982)); Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-04, 7511-14 (1982).
"See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988) (homosexual
plaintiff alleged that his discharge from the Army violated his fifth amendment right to
equal protection), aff V on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); Beller v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 1980) (homosexual plaintiff alleged his discharge from the Navy
violated his fifth amendment right to due process), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
" See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct, 2047, 2050 (1988) (a homosexual employee fired
by the CIA alleged that the dismissal was a violation of the APA as well as a violation of his
constitutional rights).
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The CIA Director has three levels of arguments that he or she
can use to defend against the lawsuit of a dismissed homosexual
employee. First, the CIA Director can defend against the allegation
that the employee's dismissal violated a federal employment pro-
tection statute. The Director can do this by arguing that none of
these statutes abridges the CIA Director's discretion to dismiss hom-
osexual employees.47
On the second level, the CIA Director can defend against the
homosexual plaintiff's constitutional claims. On the third level, the
CIA Director can argue that the court should not even hear any of
the homosexual plaintiff's claims because the CIA Director's actions
under section 102(c) represent the kind of actions that the courts
traditionally do not review.2 Thus, the CIA has a series of defenses
available against a homosexual plaintiff's claim that his or her dis-
missal from the CIA violated his or her constitutional and statutory
rights.
A. Inapplicability of Employee Protection Statutes to the CIA
A homosexual may challenge an adverse employment action
by the CIA Director under a number of employment protection
statutes.49 The CIA can defend itself from such challenges, however,
because the courts have held that none of the employment statutes
that have been the subjects of litigation limit the Director's power
to dismiss employees in the interest of national security." The courts
have exempted the CIA from the Veteran's Preference Act ("VPA"),
the Civil Service Act ("CSA"), the Civil Service Reform Act
("CSRA"), and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 5 ' As a
result, the courts have foreclosed a homosexual employee's oppor-
" See, e.g., Neely v. CIA, 27 FEP Cases 82, 85 (D.D.C. 1982) (court stated that the CSRA
did subject the CIA to the protections offered by the Act), aff'd, 744 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985); Rhodes v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 31, 36 (1962)
(court stated that neither the VPA nor the CSA limits the CIA director's authority under
section 102(c)).
'5 See Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2059 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1982); Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-04, 7511-14 (1982); Veteran's Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 851-
69 (1958) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108, 3305(b), 3311-16, 3351, 3363, 7701 (1982)).
5° See Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053 (Administrative Procedure Act); Neely v. CIA, 27 FEP
Cases 82, 85 (D.D.C. 1982) (Civil Service Reform Act), aff 'd, 744 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985); Rhodes v. United States, 156 Ct. CI. 31, 36 (1962) (Veteran's
Preference Act).
'' Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053; Neely, 27 FEP Cases at 85; Rhodes, 156 Ct. Cl. at 36.
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tunity for statutory relief from an adverse CIA employment deci-
sion.
Since the early 1960s, the courts have strictly interpreted em-
ployment protection statutes so as to exempt CIA employment de-
cisions from those statute's coverage. In 1962, the United States
Court of Claims in Rhodes v. United States held that neither the VPA
nor the CSA impaired the CIA Director's power to dismiss employ-
ees pursuant to section 102(c). 52 In Rhodes, a document analyst with
a high security clearance claimed that the CSA and the VPA limited
the Director's ability to dismiss him." The Rhodes court noted that
numerous cases had given the federal government as an employer
the right to dismiss its employees at any time as long as no statute
or regulation limited that right. 54 The Rhodes court held that the
dismissal violated no CIA regulation and stated that the statute
under which the Director fired the plaintiff, section 102(c) of the
National Security Act, grants the Director absolute rights." By hold-
ing that neither the VPA nor the CSA limits the Director's ability
to dismiss employees, the Rhodes court established that no statute in
force as of 1962 superseded section 102(c).
As Congress passed new employment protection statutes, the
courts continued to interpret them so as not to limit the CIA Di-
rector's discretion to dismiss employees under section 102(c). In
52
 Rhodes v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 31, 36 (1962).
"Id. at 33. If, at the time of the Rhodes decision, an employee qualified for protection
under the Veteran's Preference Act, then the Act, as it existed at that time, provided:
No permanent or indefinite preference eligible, who has completed a pro-
bationary or trial period in the civil service, or in any establishment, agency,
bureau, administration project, or department, hereinbefore referred to shall
be discharged, suspended for more than thirty days, furloughed without pay,
reduced in rank or compensation, or debarred for future appointment except
for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service and for reasons given
in writing . .
5 U.S.C. 863 (1958). With regard to positions exempt from the protections that the VPA
offered to preference eligibles at the time of the Rhodes decision, the Act provided:
Nothing contained in this chapter is intended to apply to any position in
or under the legislative or judicial branch of the Government or to any position
or appointment which by the Congress is required to be confirmed by or made
with the advice and consent of the United States Senate; Provided, however that
the provisions of this chapter shall apply to appointments under sections 31a,
31b, and 39 of Title 39.
5 U.S.C. § 869 (1958) (emphasis in original). But see Andrus v. Clover Constr. Co., 446 U.S.
608 (1980). The Andrus Court held that "[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain
exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence
of evidence of a contrary legislative intent." Andrus, 446 U.S. at 616-17.
54
 Rhodes, 156 Ct. Cl. at 36.
55 Id.
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1978,. Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA"),
which provided additional protections to federal government em-
ployees. Under the CSRA, Congress created the Merit Systems
Protection Board ("MSPB") and granted it authority to determine
whether certain federal employment actions resulted from illegal
discrimination.56 In the 1981 case of Neely v. CIA, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the CSRA also
fails to limit the CIA Director's discretion over employee dismissal.'"
In Neely, a former CIA employee filed a petition with the MSPB
appealing her discharge from the CIA. 58 The district court noted,
however, that the CSRA's own terms explicitly exclude the CIA and
a number of other federal entities from censure under the Act. 59
In support of this determination, the district court cited the MSPB's
own determination that the CSRA does not impair any authority
established in the National Security Act. 6° By holding that the terms
'6 Neely v. CIA, 27 FEP Cases 82, 85 (D.D.C. 1981), aff 'd, 744 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985). In the relevant section, the Civil Service Reform Act
provides that:
(a) The Merit Systems Protection Board shall —
(1) hear, adjudicate, or provide for the hearing or adjudication of all matters
within the jurisdiction of the Board under this title, section 2023 of title 38, or
any other law, rule, or regulation, end , subject to otherwise applicable provisions
of law, take final action on any such matter;
(2) order any Federal agency or employee to comply with any order or
decision issued by the Board under the authority granted under paragraph (I)
of this subsection and enforce compliance with any such order; ... ,
5 U.S.C. 1205 (1982).
57 Neely, 27 FEP Cases at 86.
58 Id. at 84.
59 Id. at 84. The Neely court based its holding on 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C) (1982) which
provides:
(C) "agency" means an Executive agency, the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, and the Government Printing Office, but does not include
.	 . .
(ii) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and, as determined
by the President, any Executive agency or unit thereof the principle function
of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities;
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C) (1982) (emphasis added).
6° Neely, 27' FEP Cases at 85. The Board justified its decision on 5 U.S.C. § 2305 (1982),
which provides:
No provision of this chapter, or action taken under this chapter, shall be
construed to impair the authorities and responsibilities set forth in Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947 . . . , the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 ... , the Act entitled "An Act to provide certain administrative au-
thorities for the National Security Agency, and for other purposes" . . . .
5 U.S.C. 2303(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 11 1986).
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of the CSRA explicitly exempt the CIA from the terms of the
statute, the Neely court established that the CSRA leaves untouched
the CIA Director's authority to dismiss employees as national se-
curity risks."'
The Neely court also concluded, however, that Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulations, promulgated
pursuant to Title V1I, apply to the CIA." 2 The Neely court noted
that the plaintiff had set EEOC procedures in motion when she
sent a letter to the CIA notifying the Agency of her complaint
As a result, the Neely court noted that the plaintiff's complaint
should have gone through the EEOC grievance system." Thus,
although the Neely court held that the CSRA failed to apply to the
CIA, it did hold that in a case of employment discrimination, the
CIA must work within the informal grievance system of the EEOC.
In addition to interpreting the CSRA, the courts have also
determined whether the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") lim-
its the CIA Director's discretion to dismiss employees. In the 1988
case of Webster v. Doe, the United States Supreme Court held that
the APA has no effect on the CIA Director's ability to dismiss
employees pursuant to section 102(c). 65 In Webster, the CIA's Office
51 See Neely, 27 FEP Cases at 85.
52 See id. at 87-89. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982). The EEOC offers no help to a
homosexual who is the victim of employment discrimination, however, because its terms only
apply to unlawful employment practices committed against an individual because of that
person's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). Courts
have held that discrimination against homosexuals is not sex discrimination, and thus the
statute offers homosexuals no protection. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608
F.2d 327,332 (9th Cir. 1979).
"' Neely, 27 FEP Cases at 88-89.
" See id. at 87-88. Title VII empowers the EEOC to prevent any unlawful employment
practice as follows:
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be
aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management 'committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job
training programs, has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Com-
mission shall serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and circum-
stances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) on such employer, em-
ployment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
(hereinafter referred to as the "respondent") within ten days, and shall make
an investigation thereof ... If the Commission determines after such investi-
gation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the
Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion ..
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
47 Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047,2053 (1988).
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of Security had determined that a covert electronics technician rep-
resented a threat to security due to his homosexuality. 66
 As a result,
the Director fired the employee under section 102(c). 67 The em-
ployee alleged, among other things, that his firing represented a
violation of section 706 of the APA because it was arbitrary and
capricious, as well as an abuse of discretion." The Webster Court
noted that the APA allows a person who is affected by the action
of any federal government agency to obtain judicial review of that
action." The Court, however, also observed that section 701(a)(1)
and section 701(a)(2) of the APA limited the availability of judicial
review under the Act. 7° The Webster Court noted that section
701(a)(1) concerns situations where statutes preclude judicial re-
view, 71
 and that it applies whenever Congress expresses an intent
to prohibit judicial review. 72
Although the Webster Court held that section 701(a)(I) does not
apply to the CIA because there is no specific statutory expression
of Congress' intent to preclude judicial review of CIA actions, the
Court also held that section 701(a)(2) does exempt the CIA Direc-
tor's power to dismiss employees under section 102(a) of the Na-
tional Security Act from judicial review under the APA. 73
 The Web-
66
 Id. at 2049.
67 Id. at 2049-50.
68 Id. at 2050.
69 Id. at 2051. In the relevant section, the APA provides:
§ 706 Scope of Review
To the extent necessary to decision, and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms
of an agency action. The reviewing court shall —
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be —
(A) arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance or procedure required by law; ..
5 U.S.C. 706 (1982).
70
 Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2051. In the relevant section, the APA provides that, "[t]his
chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that—(1) statutes
preclude judicial review; (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a) (1982).
71
 Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2051.
72 Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)).
73
 Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053.
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ster Court stated that section 701(a)(2) applied when agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law. 74 Following prior prece-
dents, 75 the Court concluded that section 701(a)(2) applied if Con-
gress, although not specifically precluding judicial review, writes a
statute in such a way "that a court would have no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discre-
tion."78
 Looking to the language of section 102(c), the Webster Court
noted that the statute provides a reviewing court with no basis on
which to assess a CIA termination decision.77 The Court therefore
concluded that the language of section 102(c) commits the dismissal
of employees to Agency discretion by law. 78
Additionally, the Webster Court concluded that the National
Security Act as a whole vests the Director of the CIA with very
broad discretion. 79 In support of this conclusion, the Webster Court
stated that national security depends on the reliability and trust-
worthiness of CIA employees. 80 By holding that section 102(c) pro-
vides a reviewing court with no judicially manageable standards for
judging the Director's exercise of discretion, the Webster Court es-
tablished that the terms of the APA exempt the CIA Director's
employment decisions from judicial review under the Act.
Therefore, with the exception of Title VII, which offers no
assistance to homosexuals,s' none of the litigated statutory limits on
a federal government agency's ability to deal with its employees
applies to the CIA. The Rhodes court held that neither the VPA nor
CSA limits the CIA Director's authority under section 102(c). 82 Also,
the Neely court stated that the terms of the CSRA specifically exempt
74 Id. at 2051.
" Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
76 Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2052 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830); see Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
410 (1971).
" Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2052; see also Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir, 1987)
(court held that a court reviewing an agency's actions under the APA should look to an
agency's formal and informal policy statements as well as statutes to locate judicially man-
ageable standards).
78 Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2052.
7° Id. (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1985)).
so Id.
81
 Title VII offers no help to a homosexual who is the victim of employment discrimi-
nation because its terms only apply to unlawful employment practices committed against an
individual because of that person's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1982). Courts have held that discrimination against homosexuals is not sex
discrimination, and thus the statute offers homosexuals no protection. See, e.g., DeSantis v.
Pacific Tel. Sc Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 332 (9th Cir. 1979).
87 Rhodes v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 31, 36 (1962).
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the CIA Director from the protections offered by the Act." More-
over, the Webster Court stated that the terms in the APA, which
exclude certain federal government actions from judicial review,
include the CIA Director's employment decisions." Therefore, a
homosexual has no statutory recourse when dismissed from the
CIA as a national security risk.
B. Availability of Constitutional Review of the CIA Director's
Employment Decisions
Although the CIA Director need not comply with the standards
governing employment decisions outlined by Congress in employ-
ment protection statutes," the Director may not dismiss employees
in violation of their constitutional rights." The United States Su-
preme Court has stated that precluding an employee's constitutional
claims that arise as a result of an adverse government employment
decision presents a serious constitutional problem. 87
 As a result,
even though they may not pursue relief under federal employment
protection statutes, homosexual employees discharged by the CIA
may still pursue a claim against the CIA Director for a violation of
their constitutional rights."
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Webster that section
701(a) of the APA may preclude judicial review of claims made
under the APA, the Webster Court also held that section 701(a)(2)
does not preclude review of colorable constitutional claims. 89 In
addition to the violations of the APA that the plaintiff alleged in
Webster, he also claimed that the Director's termination of his em-
ployment violated his constitutional rights of property, liberty, and
privacy as protected by the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amend-
63
 Neely v. CIA, 27 FEP Cases 82, 85 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 744 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985).
" Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2053 (1988).
" Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1982); Veteran's Preference Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 851-69 (1958) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108, 3305(b), 3311-16, 3351,
3363, 7701 (1982)); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-04, 7511-14 (1982).
86 Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053.
87 Id.
86 See id. at 2054.
88 Id. at 2053; see Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Local
2855 AFGE (AFL-CIO) v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 580 (3d Cir. 1979). The Third Circuit
listed three situations where a court may still review an agency action committed to agency
discretion by law: the court may entertain charges that the agency lacked jurisdiction; the
court can decide if impermissible influences occasioned the agency's decision; and the court
can review an agency decision that violates the Constitution.
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ments, as well as violating his right to procedural due process and
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fifth amendment."
The Webster Court ruled that the United States District Court
may review a constitutional claim based on an individual discharge
from the CIA." The Webster Court reasoned that a "serious consti-
tutional question" arises if a court construes a federal statute to
deny any judicial forum for a "colorable constitutional claim." 92 In
order to ensure that such a constitutional question does not arise,
the Webster Court required a court to find a clear expression of
congressional intent before holding that a statute precludes judicial
review of constitutional claims." The Webster Court noted that noth-
ing in section 102(c) of the National Security Act indicated that
Congress intended to preclude constitutional claims arising from
the Director's exercise of discretion under that section." As a result,
the Webster Court remanded the case for further proceedings on
the constitutional issues. 95 By remanding the case to the United
States District Court, the Webster Court established that a plaintiff
can still obtain review of constitutional claims even if the APA denies
that person judicial review of a statutory claim.
Because he disagreed with the majority's holding regarding the
jurisdiction of the APA, Justice Scalia dissented in Webster. 96 In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia stated that section 701(a)(2) ex-
empts even constitutional claims from review.° Justice Scalia con-
cluded that section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review in those areas
that the common law traditionally exempted from judicial oversight,
such as the political question doctrine and official immunity. 98 Jus-
tice Scalia based his conclusion on the language of section 701(a),
by contrasting section 701(a)(1) where statutes preclude judicial re-
view, with section 701(a)(2), which exempts agency action from
review when there is no law to apply.99 Because the APA uses the
99 Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2050. The employee could bring his action under the fifth
amendment because the fifth amendment protects individuals against an invasion of their
civil liberties by only the federal government. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490
(1944).
gi See Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2054.
92 Id. at 2053.
93 Id. (citing Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974)).
94 Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2054.
9' Id.
96 Id. at 2055 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
as Id. at 2056 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99 Id, (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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precise term "statutes" in one section and the more general expres-
sion "law" in the other, Justice Scalia reasoned that the term "law"
means the common law of judicial review of agency action.m
In his dissent in Webster, Justice Scalia also argued that his
interpretation of section 701(a)(2) resolves a contradiction in the
APA. 1 °' Justice Scalia noted that section 701(a)(2) disallows judicial
review when an action is "committed to agency discretion," yet
section 706 allows a court to set aside an agency action as an "abuse
of discretion."'°2 Using Justice Scalia's interpretation, in which sec-
tion 701(a)(2) exempts agency action "of the sort that is traditionally
unreviewable" from the provisions of the APA, the Act keeps certain
types of agency actions out of the court, and still allows a court to
overturn an action as an abuse of discretion, if the lawsuit is appro-
priately before the court.'"
Justice Scalia concluded that section 102(c) of the National
Security Act comprises the type of agency action committed to
agency discretion "by law" within the meaning of section
701(a)(2).'°4 In reaching his conclusion, Justice Scalia analyzed the
text of section 102(c) and found strong language committing em-
ployment decisions to the discretion of the CIA Director. 105 Justice
Scalia also based his argument on the fact that national security,
and therefore the CIA, represent an area of "predominant execu-
tive authority and of traditional judicial abstention."'° 6
In his dissent in Webster, Justice Scalia also disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that all constitutional violations must have a
judicial remedy.m 7 In support of his argument, Justice Scalia cited
several instances where a court may refuse judicial review of a
constitutional claim.' 08 Justice Scalia asserted that the Supreme
Court has found some claims beyond judicial review because they
contain "political questions."'" Justice Scalia also pointed to the
i°" Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1 ° 1 Id. at 2057 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"N See id. at 2060 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
L°5 Id. at 2060 (Scalia, J., dissenting).	 •
I" Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 2059 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"'" Id. at 2058-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 2058. Under the "political question" doctrine, the courts hold that certain
questions are non-justiciable because they present issues of constitutional law that the political
branches of the government can resolve more effectively. Redish, Judicial Review and the
"Political Question," 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031 (1985).
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doctrine of sovereign immunity which, among other things, allowed
the sovereign to take property under lawful authority without com-
pensating the owner."° Additionally, Scalia cited the doctrine of
equitable discretion, which permits a court to refuse to grant relief
where that relief impairs the public interest, even if a constitutional
claim provides the basis for that relief."' In his dissenting opinion
in Webster, Justice Scalia advocated an interpretation of the APA
that denies a plaintiff constitutional review of an agency action if
the action is the type that courts traditionally decline to review.
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's dissent, the majority in Webster
held that a plaintiff may bring a constitutional claim against the
CIA for termination of his employment." 2 By holding that a serious
constitutional question would arise if a court denied a plaintiff
constitutional review, the majority in Webster established that a court
must still hear constitutional challenges to agency actions, even
though a term of an employment protection statute precludes ju-
dicial review." 3 Should the United States Supreme Court eventually
choose to adopt the interpretation of the APA argued by Justice
Scalia, however, then a court could not review the CIA Director's
employment decisions, even on constitutional grounds.'"
C. Constitutional Challenges to a Homosexual Employee's Dismissal from
a Government Agency
Because the majority in Webster held that the APA does not
preclude constitutional review, a homosexual plaintiff has the ability
"i) Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2059 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Scalia noted that, since the passage of the Tucker Act, the sovereign could
no longer take property under lawful authority without compensating the owner. Id, In the
relevant section, the Tucker Act provides:
(a)(1) The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded upon the consti-
tution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department,
or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated
or unliquiclated damages for cases not sounding in tort. For the purposes of
this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the Army and Air Force
exchange Service, the Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, Coast Guard
Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration shall be considered an express or implied contract with the United
States.
28 U.S.C.	 149(a)(1) (1982).
"' Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2059 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"2 1d. at 2054.
"5 1d. at 2053.
" 4 /d. at 2056 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to challenge his dismissal from the CIA on constitutional grounds.
Homosexuals can challenge their dismissal by the CIA Director as
a violation of their fifth amendment rights to substantive due pro-
cess and equal protection of the laws." 5 In order to apply the strict
scrutiny standard to a substantive due process challenge, the re-
viewing court must first acknowledge that private consensual hom-
osexual conduct either represents a fundamental right in and of
itself, or that it merits inclusion in the fundamental right of pri-
vacy." 6
 Courts have held that private consensual homosexual con-
duct does not represent a fundamental right."' Likewise, the Su-
preme Court has held that the right of privacy does not include
private homosexual conduct." 8 Thus, a court would review the
constitutionality of the employee's dismissal using the minimum
rationality standard, under which the Director's actions only need
to be rationally related to a legitimate government objective." 9
A court can still review a regulation that discriminates against
homosexuals under strict scrutiny if the reviewing court considers
homosexuals a suspect class."'" The courts are split on the question
of whether homosexuals are a suspect class.' 21 In order for a court
to uphold a discriminatory regulation under the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is nec-
essary to achieve a permissible state objective.' 22
Courts have employed these standards when reviewing a hom-
osexual employee's claim that his or her dismissal from a federal
15 See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988) (homosexual
plaintiff alleged that his discharge from the Army violated his fifth amendment right to
equal protection), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); Beller v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 1980) (homosexual plaintiff alleged his discharge from the Navy
violated his fifth amendment right to due process), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
16 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Court used strict scrutiny to review
a statute that infringed upon the fundamental right to marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (Court used strict scrutiny to review a statute that infringed
upon the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship).
1 ' 7 See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zeck, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (no fundamental
right to private homosexual conduct).
"8 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (Court held that the right to
privacy does not include homosexual conduct).
"° See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 611 (1960); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2 (2d ed. 1988).
12° McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (regulation that discriminates against
a suspect class receives strict scrutiny).
121
 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988) (homosexuals are a suspect
class), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97,
103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (homosexuals are not a suspect class).
182 Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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government agency violated the employee's constitutional rights. In
the 1969 case of Norton v. Macy, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia overturned the dismissal of a homo-
sexual employee on substantive due process grounds.'" In Norton,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA") at-
tempted to discharge a homosexual budget analyst for immoral
conduct and for possessing character traits that made him unsuit-
able for further federal government employment; NASA alleged
that the employee's homosexuality created the potential for embar-
rasstnent to the agency. 124 The Norton court ruled that substantive
due process eliminates the federal government's ability to dismiss
its employees arbitrarily and capriciously. 125 Thus, the Norton court
stated that a finding of immoral conduct only justifies a dismissal if
the immoral and indecent acts of the employee have "some ascer-
tainable deleterious effect on the efficiency of the service. "126
The Norton court then cited three instances in which an em-
ployee's homosexual conduct impairs the efficiency of a government
agency.'" First, the court noted that homosexuals might jeopardize
the security of classified communications due to their susceptibility
to blackmail.'" Second, the court stated that homosexuality may
evidence an unstable personality, unsuitable for certain types of
work.' 29 Lastly, the court noted that an employee's offensive over-
tures on the job might cause negative reactions on the part of either
fellow employees or members of the public who come into contact
with a homosexual employee during the performance of his or her
official functions.'"
The Norton court also found, however, that if the only effect of
the employee's homosexuality is to cause embarrassment to the
agency, as NASA alleged, then the conduct fails to effect sufficiently
123 Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
124 1d. at 1163.
123 Id. at 1164.
1 " Id. at 1165.
122 Id. at 1166.
121' Id.
i" Id. But see Siegelman, Kinsey and Others: Empirical Input in MALE, AND FEMALE Homo-
SEXUALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES 44 (L. Diamant ed. 1987). Before reviewing the
empirical studies comparing the adjustment of homosexuals and heterosexuals, Siegelman
stated that "most of the empirical research conducted with non-clinical samples . . . found
that male homosexuals are as well adjusted as male heterosexuals." Id. at 44. Additionally,
Siegelman stated that "[t]he majority of empirical studies of adjustment concurred that female
homosexuals were not different than female heterosexuals." Id. at 49.
1211 Norton, 417 F.2d at 1166.
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the efficiency of the service.' 3 ' The Norton court reasoned that
allowing this rationale permits the agency to enforce a majoritarian
code of conduct and thereby offend liberty, privacy, and diversity.'"
Consequently, because the Norton court overturned NASA's decision
to dismiss the employee, it established that dismissing a homosexual
employee because that employee's sexual orientation causes embar-
rassment to a government agency is an arbitrary and capricious
dismissal in violation of the due process clause.
Conversely, in the 1980 case of Beller v. Middendorf, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied a homosexual's
substantive due process challenge to his discharge from the United
States Navy.'" The Beller court held that, under the circumstances
presented in the case before it, the substantive due process claim
failed because the right of privacy fails to protect homosexual con-
duct. ' 34
 In Beller, the plaintiff sought an injunction barring the Navy
from discharging him after he admitted his homosexuality during
a background check for a "top secret" security clearance.'"
The Beller court outlined the two due process standards under
which courts review government regulations.' 36
 The Beller court
held that if a government regulation restricts conduct that lacks a
"foundation in the continuing traditions of our society" or has no
connection with interests acknowledged as private and protected,
then a court applies the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny, which
is the minimum rationality standard.' 37 The court stated that under
this standard, the government only needs to demonstrate a rational
' 3 ' See id. at 1167.
172
	 at 1165.
133
 Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981). The plaintiff in Beller also alleged that the Navy regulations violated his procedural
due process interests in property and liberty. Id. at 805-07. The Beller court concluded that
the Navy regulations violated neither interest. Id. The Beller court reasoned that the regu-
lations violated no property interest of the plaintiff because they did not create an expectation
of continued Naval service sufficient to constitute a property interest. Id. at 805. Additionally,
the Beller court held that the plaintiff's discharge failed to violate his liberty interest because
the Navy discharged him for homosexuality and not unfitness. The discharge papers said
nothing about homosexuality, thus imposing no stigma on the plaintiff. Id. at 806-07.
," Id. at 810.
135 Id. at 794-95. The Beller case was one of three cases heard concurrently by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 792. All three cases had the same broad outline: the
Navy discharged an enlisted person with a fine performance record after he or she admitted
engaging in homosexual acts, conduct prohibited by Navy regulations. Id.
"6 See id. at 808.
17 /d. at 808.
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relationship between its regulation and a legitimate government
interest to receive judicial approval.'" The court noted that a re-
viewing court uses the stricter standard, the compelling state interest
test, when the government regulation "seriously intrudes into mat-
ters which lie at the core of interests deserving due process protec-
tion."'" The Beller court held that the case currently before it fell
somewhere between these two standards.'" The Beller court noted
that in the future, a homosexual plaintiff may be able to make a
substantial constitutional challenge to some of the government re-
strictions on private homosexual conduct."' The Beller court held,
however, that the Navy's regulations barring homosexuals do not
amount to an instance where the state used its criminal processes
to enforce a moral precept. 142 Thus, the Beller court established
that, in the case before it, the right of privacy did not include private
homosexual conduct. At the same time, the court also established
that restrictions against private homosexual conduct deserve an
undetermined level of heightened scrutiny.
In addition to holding that Navy restrictions on private hom-
osexual conduct deserved judicial review under heightened scru-
tiny, the Beller court held that the Navy regulations in question had
a close relationship to an important federal government interest. 143
The Beller court stated that a substantive due process review of a
federal government regulation involved a balancing of the individ-
ual interest infringed, the degree of infringement, the government
interest furthered, and the feasibility of a more narrow alterna-
tive.'" The Beller court noted that, in the case before it, military
necessities outweighed the infringement of constitutional rights by
Navy regulations. 145 The court also concluded that the Navy regu-
lations which disqualified homosexuals from service had a rational
relationship to military discipline, because a substantial number of
Navy personnel base their feelings toward homosexuals on moral
precepts.'" This attitude creates tension and hostility toward horn-
128 Id.
132 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 810.
142 Id.
14 ' See ed.
144 Id. at 807.
145 1d. at 811.
146 /d. at 811-12.
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osexuals and impairs a homosexual's ability to command respect.' 47
Additionally, the Beller court decided that requiring the Navy to
evaluate each homosexual's case before discharging that particular
serviceman would be impractical.'" Through its holding that the
Navy can discharge homosexuals, the Beller court established that a
rational relationship to a military necessity outweighs the right to
private homosexual conduct.
Unlike Beller, in which the court reviewed a military discharge
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, in the 1988
case of Watkins v. United Stales Army, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed a constitutional challenge
to a military discharge under fifth amendment equal protection
principles.' 49 The Watkins court held that homosexuals comprise a
suspect class and thus regulations affecting them deserve strict scru-
tiny. 150
 In order to pass the strict scrutiny standard, a discriminatory
government regulation must be necessary for the achievement of a
permissible state objective. 151
In Watkins, the Army initially inducted the plaintiff despite his
admissions of homosexuality. In 1981, however, the Army passed
new regulations disqualifying all homosexuals and discharged the
plaintiff as a result.' 52 The Watkins court noted that the United
States Supreme Court precedent that declined to protect homosex-
ual conduct under the right of privacy did not foreclose the possi-
bility of reviewing discrimination against homosexuals under fifth
amendment equal protection principles. 153 The Watkins court stated
that, in order for a group to merit consideration as a suspect class,
it must be the subject of historical discrimination;' 54
 the discrimi-
197
18 See id. at 810.
149
 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd an other grounds, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff in Watkins also contended that his discharge from the
Army was an arbitrary and capricious firing in violation of the APA, as well as a violation of
his first amendment rights. Id. at 1334. The Watkins court rejected the plaintiff's contentions
of an arbitrary and capricious discharge because he failed to allege that the regulations
discharging homosexuals violated the APA. Id. The Watkins court also rejected the plaintiff's
first amendment contentions because the Army discharged personnel pursuant to its regu-
lations because of their homosexual orientation rather than for their admissions of homo-
sexual acts. Id, at 1337.
' 50 Id, at 1349.
181
 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
182
 Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1330-32.
'" Id. at 1340; see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). In Hardwick, the United
States Supreme Court held that private consensual homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental
right protected by the Federal Constitution. Id. at 191.
1 " Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1345.
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nation against the group must be unfair; 155 and the group must
lack political power.' 56
The Watkins court applied the three factors to homosexuals,
held that homosexuals satisfy all of the necessary criteria and
granted homosexuals suspect class status. 157 The court stated that
homosexuals historically suffered discrimination because they face
discrimination equal to that encountered by groups already treated
as suspect classes.' 58 Also, the Watkins court concluded that homo-
sexuals encounter unfair discrimination because the Army bases its
rationale for discharging homosexuals on prejudice.I 59 Additionally,
the Watkins court stated that homosexuals lack political power be-
cause they comprise a discrete and insular minority. '60 By granting
homosexuals suspect class status, the Watkins court established that
a reviewing court must subject any rule discriminating against hom-
osexuals to strict scrutiny under fifth amendment equal protection
principles.
In order to pass strict scrutiny, the Watkins court held that a
federal government regulation must be necessary to promote a
compelling state interest.I 61 The Watkins court separated the Army's
justifications for its regulations that disqualify homosexuals into two
types.' 62 The court held that the first type of justification contained
no compelling state interest,'" and that the regulations at issue had
no relationship to the second type of justification, which did contain
a compelling state interest. 164 The Watkins court stated that the first
type of justification, in which the Army argued that a soldier's
homosexuality affects morale and discipline because other Army
personnel hate homosexuals, illegitimately caters to private biases.'"
The Watkins court held that "notions of majoritarian morality" can-
not serve as a compelling state interest.' 66
135 Id. at 1345-46. The Watkins court stated that unfairness embodied three factors. First,
society defines the class by a trait bearing no relation to the members' ability to perform or
contribute to society. Second, society saddles the class with unique disabilities because of
prejudice or unfair stereotypes. Third, society defines the class by an immutable trait. Id.
156 /d. at 1348.
157 /d, at 1345-49.
"" Id. at 1345.
I" See id. at 1346-47.
160 1d, at 1348-49.
Id. at 1349.
02 Id. at 1350-52.
143 Id. at 1351.
1" Id. at 1352.
10 Id. at 1350.
too Id. at 1351.
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The Watkins court stated that the second type of justification
advanced by the Army in defense of its regulations contained two
compelling state interests, military discipline and security against
blackmail. The court held, however, that the Army tailored its reg-
ulations too narrowly to advance these interests.' 67 The court re-
jected the Army's argument that its regulations promoted military
discipline because disqualifying homosexuals eliminates the possi-
bility of a superior officer developing a relationship with another
soldier. 168
 The Watkins court observed that the Army does have a
compelling interest in preventing sexual relationships between of-
ficers and their subordinates; however, the Watkins court also stated
that the Army's regulations were too narrow to advance this interest
because they only addressed the problem in terms of homosexuals
and made no mention of heterosexual relationships between officers
and subordinates.
The Watkins court also noted that the Army has a compelling
interest in the prevention of blackmail. The court observed, how-
ever, that the Army's regulations barring homosexuals failed to
address this interest because only secretive homosexuals are suscep-
tible to blackmail, whereas the regulations only discharged admitted
homosexuals.' 69 By holding that the exclusion of homosexuals from
the Army has no rational relationship to either military discipline
or security, the Watkins court established that a regulation discrim-
inating against homosexuals must have a close and definite rela-
tionship to a compelling state interest in order to survive judicial
review under strict scrutiny.
In the 1987 case of Padula v. Webster, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia also considered the merits
of granting homosexuals suspect class status."° The Padula court,
however, refused to grant homosexuals this status."' In Padula, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI" or "Bureau") refused to
employ the plaintiff as a special agent due to her homosexuality. 172
Although she did not flaunt her homosexuality, the plaintiff main-
tained an open, unembarrassed attitude about it; consequently, her
family, friends, and co-workers all knew of her orientation.'" The
' 67 Id. at 1352.
168 Id.
'0 Id.
17° Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
171 Id.
' 72 Id. at 99.
'" Id.
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Padula court pointed out that Supreme Court and circuit court
precedents deny homosexual conduct constitutional protection be-
cause the right of privacy does not protect such conduct' 74 and
because there is no fundamental right to engage in such conduct.' 75
The court ruled that these precedents foreclosed the possibility of
homosexuals achieving suspect class status. 176 The Padula court con-
ceded that both of these precedents only addressed privacy issues
and did not expressly consider whether homosexuals constitute a
suspect class.'" The court noted, however, that declining to recog-
nize a privacy right to engage in homosexual sodomy "seemed" to
regard the question of whether homosexuals are entitled to suspect
class status as settled.' 78
 The court noted that the United States
Supreme Court permits the states to criminalize homosexual con-
duct. The court further stated that homosexual conduct defines the
class of homosexuals. The Padula court concluded that awarding
suspect class status to a class defined by potentially criminal conduct
was anomalous.' 79
As an additional reason for concluding that homosexuals fail
to merit consideration as a suspect class, the Padula court noted
several justifications for discrimination against homosexuals.'s° The
Padula court held that the United States Supreme Court bases its
identification of certain groups as suspect classes on the implicit
notion that invidious discrimination against the particular class is
plainly unjustifiable.' 8 ' With respect to homosexuals, however, the
Padula court noted at least two instances in which the FBI can justify
discrimination. 18" First, the Padula court stated that roughly half of
the states criminalize homosexual conduct; consequently, employing
homosexual agents undermines the law enforcement credibility of
the Bureau because FBI agents must work in all fifty states.'" Also,
the Padula court noted that the FBI could rationally conclude that
public dislike for homosexuals renders them susceptible to black-
1 " Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (the United States Supreme Court
held that the right of privacy does not extend to private homosexual sodomy).
175
 Dronenburg v. Zeck, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. Cir, 1984) (the court held that it is
impossible to conclude that homosexual conduct is a fundamental right).
06 Padula, 822 F.2d at 103.
177 Id.
"9 Id.
"9 Id.
LBS Id. at 103-04.
151 /d. at 103.
"2 Id. at 104.
183 Id.
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mail to protect either their partners or themselves, an especially
important concern for the FBI because it works in counterintellig-
ence.' 84 Because the Padula court both interpreted prior precedents
to foreclose homosexuals' ability to receive consideration as a sus-
pect class, and stated two valid justifications for discriminating
against homosexuals, it established that homosexuals do not merit
status as a suspect class.
Thus, the courts have traditionally ruled in favor of the federal
government when a homosexual challenges an employment deci-
sion on constitutional grounds.'" When reviewing a homosexual's
claim that a dismissal by the federal government infringes upon his
fifth amendment right to subStantive due process, the courts have
held that the right to privacy does not include private homosexual
conduct. 188 Additionally, courts have held that no fundamental right
to engage in private consensual homosexual conduct exists. 187 The
courts are split, however, on the issue of whether homosexuals
constitute a suspect class. 188 Should the majority of courts choose to
follow the Ninth Circuit and consider homosexuals a suspect class,
then the courts would require the federal government to justify its
regulations discriminating against homosexuals as necessary to pro-
mote a compelling state interest.' 89 Should the majority of courts
not grant homosexuals suspect class status, however, then the courts
would only require the federal government to justify regulations
that discriminate against homosexuals in terms of some government
purpose in order to pass judicial scrutiny, which is the minimum
rationality standard.' 90
D. National Security as a Compelling State Interest
Should the courts choose to review the CIA Director's discrim-
inations against homosexuals using either a heightened scrutiny or
151 Id.
185 See Padula, 822 F.2d at 103; Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 952 U.S. 905 (1981).
013 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (privacy does not include homo-
sexual sodomy).
)" 7 See Dronenburg v. Zeck, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
'a" See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988) (court held that
homosexuals qualify as 'a suspect class), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th . Cir. 1989);
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (court held that homosexuals do not
merit suspect class status).
leg Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1349.
Padula, 822 F.2d at 104.
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strict scrutiny standard, the question still remains whether the CIA
can identify a compelling state interest. Furthermore, under the
strict scrutiny standard, the discrimination must also have a close
and definite relationship to that compelling state interest. Tradi-
tionally, the courts have considered national security, and more
specifically the security of information possessed by the CIA, a
compelling state interest.' 9 ' Additionally, the courts have deferred
to the judgment of national security officials that a sufficiently close
relationship exists between their actions and the protection of na-
tional security.' 92
Courts consider the protection of the national security a com-
pelling state interest. In the 1980 case of Snepp v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court permitted the CIA to infringe on an
American citizen's first amendment rights in the interest of national
security.' 95 In Snepp, a former CIA agent published a book about
Agency activity in South Vietnam without first submitting the manu-
script to the Agency for pre-publication review.' 94
 While still em-
ployed by the CIA, Snepp signed an agreement providing that he
would not publish any material relating to Agency activities, either
during or after his employment with the CIA without specific prior
approval of the Agency. Additionally, Snepp made a concurrent
promise not to disclose classified information without authoriza-
tion.' 95
In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ruled in United States v. Snepp that Snepp breached his
contract with the CIA and granted the CIA an injunction against
future violations. The court of appeals refused, however, to estab-
lish a constructive trust and thereby award the profits of Snepp's
book to the federal government, because Snepp had a first amend-
ment right to publish unclassified information. 198
 Both Snepp and
the government appealed, and the United States .Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the judgment.' 97
191 See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
501, 509 n.3 (1980)); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 501, 509 n.3 (1980).
'9z
	 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944); United States v. Truong
Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
193
 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1980); see also McGehee v. Casey, 718
F.2d 1137, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (the CIA censored an ex-agent's manuscript after he
submitted it to the Agency for approval).
' 94 Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507-08.
199 Id, at 508.
1" Id. at 509-10. See U.S. v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
197 Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and, in Snepp v. United States, held that establishing the constructive
trust provided the best solution because of both the importance of
maintaining the secrecy of national security information,'° 5 and the
inadequacy of awarding damages to the federal government.' 99 The
Court held that the federal government has a compelling state
interest in protecting both the secrecy of important national security
information, and the appearance of confidentiality, which is essen-
tial to the effective operation of the intelligence service. 200 Addi-
tionally, the Court stated three reasons why damages provide an
inadequate remedy for the federal government. 201 First, a court
could only establish damages through speculation. 202 Second, nom-
inal damages amount to a hollow alternative that fails to deter future
violations of the promise. 203 Lastly, punitive damages are both spec-
ulative and unusual. 204 By creating a constructive trust for the ben-
efit of the government, the Snepp Court established that the protec-
tion of CIA sources and information represents a compelling state
interest.
In addition to considering the protection of CIA sources a
compelling state interest, the courts also consider the protection of
all information possessed by the CIA to be a compelling state inter-
est. In the 1985 case of CIA v. Sims, the United States Supreme
Court held that the CIA Director need not divulge intelligence
sources as required by the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
if revealing the sources compromises the national security. 205 In
1 "' Id. at 512.
199 /d. at 514-16.
200 Id. at 509 n.3. The Snepp Court noted that the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia and the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia both held that even
the publication of unclassified material can harm national security interests. Id. at 511-12.
The Snepp Court stated that the CIA has a broader understanding than an individual
employee of what revelations may expose classified information and confidential sources. Id.
at 512.
2" 1 Id. at 514.
"2 Id.
"5 Id.
201 Id. at 514, The Snepp Court also noted that a damage trial involved probing into the
CIA's highly confidential affairs. Id. at 514-15.
"5 CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 156,181 (1985). In the relevant section, the FOIA provides:
(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (I)
and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A)
reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published
rules stating the time, place, fees, (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall
make the records promptly available to any person.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982).
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Sims, the plaintiffs filed suit under the FOIA, requesting the names
of institutions and individuals who performed research for a CIA
project entitled operation MKULTRA. 2°6 The CIA contended that
exemption 3 to the FOIA, which protects matters specifically ex-
empted from disclosure by statute,2°7 permitted the CIA not to
divulge intelligence sources and methods pursuant to section
102(d)(3) of the National Security Act. 208
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held that only sources which would not provide information
without a CIA guarantee of confidentiality constituted protected
information sources under section IO2(d)(3). 209 Thus, according to
the court of appeals, only sources that require a guarantee of con-
fidentiality deserve exemption from disclosure under the FOIA. 210
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
the plain meaning of section IO2(d)(3) indicates that the section
represents the type of statute that exemption 3 of the FOIA in-
tended to protect from disclosure. 2 " The Sims Court stated that any
206 Sims, 471 U,S. at 163. Operation MKULTRA involved the research and development
of chemical, biological, and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine
operations to control human behavior. Id. at 161-62 (citing SELECT ComstrrrEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S.
REP.•NO. 755, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. Book 1, 1, 389 (1976)).
217 Sims, 471 U.S. at 163. In the relevant section, the FO1A provides:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are —
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b
of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of
material withheld;  
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B) (1982).
206 Sims, 471 U.S. at 164. In the relevant section, the National Security Act provides:
(d) Powers and Duties
For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several
government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it
shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security
Council —
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security,
and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the
Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided,
. . . . And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure; . .
50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1982).
2C* Sims, 471 U.S. at 164.
2I°
 Id.
2 " 1d. at 167.
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and all CIA information sources represent important national se-
curity information because they offer foreign intelligence services
a clue to the CIA's sources and methods of operation. 212 In rejecting
the court of appeals' interpretation of section 102(d)(3), the Sims
Court also stated that potential intelligence sources will discontinue
their availability if they know that judges who have little or no
background in intelligence gathering" can order their identity re-
vealed after determining that the CIA's promise of confidentiality
to the source was unnecessary. 2 l 3 By holding that exemption 3 of
the FOIA permits the CIA to withhold information about intelli-
gence sources, the Sims Court established that the revelation of any
CIA source represents a potential threat to national security.
Consequently, the protection of all information possessed by
the CIA is a compelling state interest. In order to pass a heightened
scrutiny test, however, the CIA must also demonstrate that its dis-
missal of homosexual employees is necessary to protect this com-
pelling state interest. In the arena of national security, courts often
defer to the judgment of the government agencies as to whether
their actions further a compelling state interest. In the 1944 decision
of Korematsu v. United States, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that actions taken to protect the nation from espionage and sabotage
during wartime justified discrimination against a specific racial
class. 21 In Korematsu, American citizens of Japanese descent chal-
lenged their convictions for remaining in a "military area" despite
the 1942 orders of the Commanding General of the Western Com-
mand, which excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from that
area.215 The Korematsu Court held that all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect and hence subject to the most rigid scrutiny. 216 The Kore-
matsu Court stated that "nothing short of apprehension by the
proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the
public safety could constitutionally justify" the measures."' The
212 M. at 176-77. The Sims Court noted an example: if a foreign intelligence service
knew the CIA subscribed to an obscure but publicly available Eastern European technical
journal, it would thwart the CIA's efforts to exploit the journal's value. Id. at 177.
215 M. at 176.
214 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (an American citizen of Japanese ancestry challenged his conviction
for violating the military commander's curfew).
215 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 2113-16.
216 1d. at 216.
2°
 M. at 218.
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Korematsu Court stated that it deferred to the judgment of the
military authorities that the large Japanese population on the west
coast included disloyal members, and thus represented a threat of
espionage and sabotage.218 Because the military authorities found
it impossible to separate loyal Japanese Americans from disloyal,
the Korematsu Court ruled that the exclusion of all Japanese Amer-
icans from the west coast bore a definite and close relationship to
the prevention of the threat:219 Although commentators have criti-
cized the Supreme Court's holding in Korematsu,22° the case dem-
onstrates that courts will defer to the judgment of the military
authorities that their actions are necessary to protect the national
security.
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit also deferred to the judgment of an intelligence
agency in an investigation involving national security. In the 1980
case of United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, the Fourth Circuit held
that an executive agency could use unwarranted electronic surveil-
lance while investigating the foreign intelligence aspect of national
security. 221
 In Truong, the FBI monitored the defendant's commu-
nications in order to determine whether he obtained and transmit-
ted classified information to the Vietnamese delegation during the
1977 Paris negotiations between the United States and Vietnam. 222
The Truong court stated three reasons for having a foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement. 223 First, the
Truong court noted that the compelling needs of the executive in
the area of foreign intelligence justify the exception. 224 In the area
of foreign intelligence, the Truong court stated that executive action
requires speed, stealth, and security, and that procedural hurdles
delay the executive's ability to respond to situations, both limiting
the executive's flexibility and increasing the chance of information
leaks. 225 Second, the Truong court noted the executive's unparalleled
210 Id
219 See id.
220 See, e.g., Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's
Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1945); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-6, 16-22 (2d ed. 1988).
221 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 917 (4th Cir. 1980), Celt denied,
454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
222 Truong, 629 F.2d at 911-12.
223 Id. at 913-14.
224 Id. at 913.
225 Id.
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expertise in foreign policy matters and stressed that the judiciary's
inexperience in this area renders it incompetent to judge the im-
portance of the information to the United States and to make a
decision regarding probable cause. 226
 Lastly, the Truong court cited
the fact that the constitution designates the executive branch as the
pre-eminent authority in the arena of foreign affairs. 227
 By recog-
nizing the compelling needs of the executive in the area of national
security, the Truong court established the foreign intelligence ex-
ception to the warrant requirement.
The Truong court also set forth certain requirements that the
executive agency must fulfill in order to use the foreign intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement. Because allowing electronic
surveillance compromises privacy interests, the court carefully lim-
ited this exception to the fourth amendment. 228
 In order for a court
to relieve the federal government of the restrictions of the fourth
amendment, the Truong court concluded that the object of the
search must be a foreign agent or the agent's collaborators. 229 The
Truong court reasoned that the search of a foreign agent or its
collaborators presents the greatest need for "speed, stealth, and
secrecy" and requires subtle judgments regarding national secu-
rity. 23° Additionally, the Truong court held that the executive agency
must conduct the search primarily for intelligence reasons." The
Truong court recognized the impossibility of limiting the exception
to surveillance conducted exclusively for intelligence reasons, be-
cause intelligence investigations give rise to criminal charges, such
as espionage. 232 The Truong court also recognized, however, that in
a criminal investigation, a court is entirely competent to make the
24e Id. at 913-14.
227 Id. at 914.
220 Id.
229 Id. at 915. But see the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
11 (1982). In the relevant section, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides:
(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney
General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this
chapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods up to one year
if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that —
(II) there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the
contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party; ....
50 U.S.C. 1802 (1982).
2" Truong, 629 F.2d at 915.
29 L Id.
"2 Id. at 915-16.
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usual determination of probable cause. 233 By allowing a foreign
intelligence exception to the fourth amendment, the court in Truong
demonstrated that a court will defer to an executive agency's judg-
ment that certain information is important to foreign policy matters.
In addition to deferring to the judgment of the FBI about what
information is important to the foreign policy of the United States,
the courts defer to the CIA's judgment as to whether information
is important to national security. In the 1983 case of McGehee v.
Casey, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held both that the CIA's system of classifying and censoring
secret information is constitutional, and that a court reviewing
whether the CIA properly classified certain information as "secret"
should give deference to the CIA's reasons why the information is
so classified. 234 In McGehee, the CIA classified certain portions of a
former CIA agent's manuscript as "secret" and censored those por-
tions of the text. 235 The McGehee court stated that the two factors
that a court must consider when determining whether government
censorship of its employees' free speech violates the first amend-
ment are: first, whether the restrictions on speech protect a "sub-
stantial government interest unrelated to free speech,"236
 and sec-
ond, whether the restrictions are sufficiently narrow to restrict only
the speech that will harm the government interest. 237 The court
concluded that the censorship of "secret" information did protect
the substantial government interest of national security, an interest
unrelated to free speech.238 Additionally, the court concluded that
the censorship of only the "secret" information was narrow enough
to censor only that information which would harm national security
if revealed. 239
In McGehee, the former CIA agent also contended that the
information that the Agency censored was improperly classified as
", Id. at 915,
234
 McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1983). "Secret" information includes
any information which, if disclosed, could "reasonably be expected to cause serious damage
to the national security." Id. at 1143 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190, 191
(1979)). Subsequent to McGehee, Executive Order Number 12,356 revoked Executive Order
Number 12,065 and imposed a different national security information classification and
access scheme. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874, 14,884 (1982) reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 app. at 51-56 (1982). The definition of "secret" information, however, remains
the same. Id. at 14,875.
2" McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1140.
238 Id. at 1142 (quoting Brown v. Clines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980)).
2" Id. at 1143 (quoting Brown v. Clines, 444 U.S. 348, 355 (1980)).
238 Id.
299 Id.
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"secret."24 ° The McGehee court held that the CIA properly classified
the censored portions of the ex-agent's article as "secret." 24 ' The
court stated that, when reviewing CIA information classification
decisions, a trial court should require the CIA to explain why the
information is classified as "secret" by listing specific reasons de-
scribing the connection between the information and national se-
curity. 242 The court added that a trial court should defer to CIA
judgment as to what information is important in the field of intel-
ligence gathering.243 The court also stated, however, that because it
is the task of the trial court to protect individual rights, the court
should be sure that the CIA reasons for their classification are
rational and logical. 244 Thus, in McGehee, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia established that a trial court
should defer to the CIA's judgment as to what information amounts
to "secret" information and can consequently be censored.
Therefore, the courts have held that national security consti-
tutes a compelling state interest. 245
 More specifically, the courts have
ruled that the confidentiality of CIA information sources and tech-
niques is a compelling state interest. 246 Under strict scrutiny, how-
ever, in order for the federal government to use the compelling
state interest of national security as a justification for discriminating
against homosexuals, it must demonstrate that the discrimination
has at least a rational relationship to this compelling state interest. 247
The courts have stated that they lack expertise in the field of na-
tional security,248 and thus have held that national security agencies
can make a determination that a sufficiently close relationship ex-
ists. 249 Thus, a homosexual has little chance of challenging the CIA
Director on constitutional grounds under either a heightened scru-
tiny or strict scrutiny standard.
242 Id. at 1140.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1148.
20 Id. at 1149.
244 id.
245 See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 156, I75 (1985) (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980)); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
246
	 Sims, 471 U.S. at 175 (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3);
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
247 See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 808 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981).
246
	 Sims, 471 U.S. at 176; United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913-
14 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
214 See, e.g., Truong, 629 F.2d at 915.
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III. A HOMOSEXUAL PLAINTIFF'S POOR CHANCES OF SUCCESSFULLY
CHALLENGING HIS OR HER DISMISSAL FROM THE CIA IN COURT
Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 grants the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency discretion to fire any
employee if the Director deems the dismissal necessary or advisable
in the interest of the United States. 25° A homosexual employee
whom the Director discharges pursuant to section 102(c) because
the Director deems the employee's homosexuality a threat to na-
tional security stands little chance of successfully challenging the
Director's actions in court on either constitutional grounds or under
an employment protection statute.
In analyzing whether an employment protection statute limits
the Director's discretion to dismiss employees, the courts demon-
strate their admiration for the CIA by either declaring the Director's
power under section 102(c) superior to other statutes, or by placing
section 102(c) outside the jurisdiction of the employment protection
statute. 25 ' As a result of the courts' high opinion of the CIA, a
homosexual plaintiff has little chance of receiving any job security
through any of these employment protection statutes.
If a homosexual challenges his dismissal by the Director on
constitutional grounds, the courts review the Director's discrimi-
nation against homosexuals using only a heightened scrutiny stan-
dard, rather than the more stringent strict scrutiny standard, be-
cause of their underlying dislike for homosexuals. 252
 The CIA can
easily demonstrate a compelling state interest that outweighs the
heightened scrutiny because the courts recognize the protection of
almost all information possessed by the CIA as a compelling state
interest. 253
 Additionally, the courts will defer to the judgment of
the Director that a sufficiently close relationship exists between any
protective measures taken by the Director and the security of sen-
25° 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1982). See supra note 5 for the text of § 102(c) of the National
Security Act of 1947.
251 See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2053 (Court held that § 701(a)(2) of the
APA exempts the CIA from review under the Act); Neely v. CIA, 27 FEP Cases 82, 85
(D.D.C. 1982) (court held that § 2302(a)(2)(ii) of the CSRA exempts the CIA from review
under the Act), aff 'd, 744 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985); Rhodes
v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 31, 36 (1962) (court held that the CIA Director's power under
§ 102(c) is superior to any other statute).
2" See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809 (9th Cir. 1980) (court held that standard
for reviewing a homosexual's equal protection argument is somewhere between minimum
rationality and strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
2" See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1985).
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sitive intelligence information. 254 Due to the courts' underlying dis-
like for homosexuals and overt admiration for the CIA, a homo-
sexual has little chance of defeating the CIA Director's exercise of
discretion under section 102(c) on constitutional grounds.
Even if the courts choose to follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit
and recognize homosexuals as a suspect class, raising the level of
scrutiny does not guarantee victory for a homosexual challenging
his dismissal by the CIA Director. 255 First, the court might decide
that dismissing a homosexual employee is necessary to protect the
national security and therefore hold the dismissal constitutional
under even the strict scrutiny standard. Second, the courts' admi-
ration for the CIA and distaste for homosexuals might lead them
to adopt the interpretation of the APA argued by Justice Scalia in
his dissent in Webster v. Doe. 256 Although Justice Scalia's reading of
the APA provides courts with more guidance when deciding if an
agency action falls within the jurisdiction of the APA, that guidance
will also lead courts to deny constitutional review of the Director's
exercise of employment discretion under section 102(c). 257
Therefore, the CIA has a wealth of defenses at its disposal if a
homosexual challenges his dismissal from the Agency. The courts
have held that the Agency is immune from attack under employ-
ment protection statutes. 258 The courts also hold for the government
in constitutional attacks because they believe homosexuals threaten
the national security. 259 Moreover, should a grant of suspect class
status strengthen a homosexual's constitutional case against the
CIA, the Agency may urge the courts to adopt the interpretation
of the APA set forth in Justice Scalia's dissent in Webster, which
denies all judicial review of the CIA Director's employment deci-
sions made pursuant to section 102(c). 260
754 See Korematsu v. United States, 324 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
2" See Watkins v, U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds,
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir, 1989).
256 See Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2059 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257 See Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2063 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258 See, e.g., Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053 (Court held that § 701(a)(2) of the APA exempts
the CIA from review under the Act); Neely v. CIA, 27 FEY Cases 82, 85 (D.D.C. 1982) (court
held that ft 2302(a)(2)(ii) of the CSRA exempts the CIA from review under the Act), aff'd,
744 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985); Rhodes v. United States,
156 Ct. Cl. 31, 36 (1962) (court held that the CIA Director's power under .§ 102(c) is superior
to any other statute).
258 See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (prevention of black-
mail); Beller, 632 F.2d at 811 (military necessities).
26° See Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2055 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A. Statutory Claims
A homosexual has almost no chance of successfully challenging
his dismissal from the CIA under an employment protection stat-
ute.26 ' The courts have held that any statute which potentially grants
a homosexual relief does not offer protection to CIA employees. 262
The methods used by the courts when holding that the CIA is
exempt from these employment protection statutes demonstrate the
courts' partiality for the Agency. If the employment protection
statute specifically exempts the CIA from its coverage, then the
courts have used the proper method of statutory analysis. 263 If the
statute makes no mention of the CIA, however, then the courts have
declared the Agency exempt without any supporting authority. 264
In Rhodes v. United States, when a CIA employee claimed that
the Veteran's Preference Act limited the CIA Director's power to
terminate his employment, 265
 the United States Court of Claims
held that no statute superseded section 1 02(c)'s grant of employ-
ment discretion to the Director. 266
 Under the provisions of the VPA
at the time of the Rhodes decision, the VPA covered all executive
branch employees, which would presumably include the CIA. 267
Without any statutory authority, the Rhodes court incorrectly de-
clared that the Director's employment decisions were "absolute" and
therefore exempt from the jurisdiction of the VPA. By placing the
CIA Director's employment decisions outside the jurisdiction of the
VPA, the Rhodes court demonstrated its partiality for the Agency.
If the employment protection statute specifically exempts the
CIA from its coverage, however, the courts use the correct method
of applying the statute in order to deny a plaintiff's claim of a
discriminatory discharge by the CIA. In Neely v. CIA, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia exempted the CIA
from the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems Protection Board
("MSPB") because the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA") specifi-
cally excluded the Agency from the statute's coverage. 268
 The Neely
261 See e.g., Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053 (no review under the AM); Neely, 27 FEP Cases
at 85 (no review under the CSRA); Rhodes, 156 Ct. Cl. at 36 (no review under the VPA).
262 See Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053; Neely, 27 FEP Cases at 85; Rhodes, 156 Ct. Cl. at 36.
263
 See Andrus v. Clover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616, 616-17 (1980).
264 See Rhodes, 156 Ct. Cl. at 36.
265 Id. at 33.
266 Id. at 36.
267 5 U.S.C. 869 (1958). See supra note 53 for the text of § 869 listing the exclusions
which applied to the VPA at the time of the Rhodes decision.
266 Neely, 27 FEP Cases at 85. See supra note 60 for the relevant portion of the CSRA.
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court did not use the same method as the Rhodes court, which
automatically held that the employment protection statute failed to
include CIA employees. Rather, the Neely court correctly looked to
the terms of the CSRA and found that the Act specifically exempted
the CIA from its jurisdiction. Thus, the Neely court demonstrated
that when an employment protection statute specifically exempts
the CIA from its jurisdiction, then the courts properly look to the
language of the statute.
Like the Neely court, the United States Supreme Court in Webs-
ter v. Doe looked to the terms of the statute in question, in this case
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), to determine if the APA
provided CIA employees with protection against arbitrary and ca-
pricious employment decisions by the Director. 269 The APA, how-
ever, contains no term that specifically exempts any executive
agency from its jurisdiction. 270 Instead, the APA uses only general
terms that exempt agencies from judicial review if the agency action
"is committed to agency discretion by law." 27 I For the Webster Court
to conclude that this exemption includes the CIA, it had to hold
that Congress wrote section 102(c) in such broad terms that no
standards against which to judge the CIA Director's exercise of
employment discretion were available. 272 Section 102(c) provides
that the Director can only dismiss employees in the interest of
national security. 275 Despite its lack of detailed standards with which
to review the Director's actions, section 102(c) at the very least
establishes as a standard that a dismissal must be in the interest of
national security. 274 The Webster Court incorrectly held, however,
that section 102(c) provided it with no standards against which to
judge the CIA Director's dismissal of a homosexual employee, and
thus ruled that under the APA, a court cannot review the Director's
exercise of employment discretion. 275 By exempting the CIA from
2" See Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2051-53.
270 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982). See supra note 70 for the relevant portion of the statute.
271 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). See supra note 70 for the relevant portion of the statute.
272 See Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2052 (1988).
2" 5 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1982). See supra note 5 for the full text of § 102(c) of the National
Security Act of 1947.
2" See Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2057 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ( Justice Scalia stated that section
102(c) establishes standards for the exercise of the ,Director's dismissal power, prohibiting
dismissals made out of personal vindictiveness or because the Director wants to give the job
to his cousin); Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub TW1T1.
Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988) (court held that section 102(c) provided a standard,
allowing the Director to dismiss employees only in the interest of national security).
272 Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2052.
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the jurisdiction of the APA, the United States Supreme Court once
again demonstrated courts' partiality towards the CIA.
Therefore, a homosexual cannot rely on employment protec-
tion statutes such as the VPA, the CSRA, or the APA when chal-
lenging his or her dismissal from the CIA. 27° Courts have held that
none of these statutes offers any protection to CIA employees. 277
Moreover, the methods by which some courts exempt the Agency
from the jurisdiction of these statutes demonstrate courts' deference
to the CIA Director's decisions. As a result, a homosexual must use
constitutional avenues if that employee wishes to challenge his or
her dismissal from the CIA successfully.
W Constitutional Challenges
Although the courts foreclose a homosexual from statutorily
obtaining review of a dismissal by the CIA Director, they still allow
constitutional review of the CIA Director's exercise of discretion. 278
Homosexuals, however, also stand very little chance of succeeding
in their constitutional challenges. The courts generally find merit
in the reasons asserted by the federal government as justification
for dismissing a homosexual despite the fact that stereotypes, prej-
udice against homosexuals, and some questionable logic underlie
these reasons. 279 Also, the courts have ruled that a sufficient con-
nection exists between the dismissal of a homosexual and the fur-
therance of a compelling state interest:28" As a result, the CIA can
successfully defend its employment decisions against a constitutional
challenge made by a homosexual plaintiff by asserting that the
dismissal furthers the compelling state interest of national security.
In Norton v. Macy, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia permitted the stereotype of homosexuals as
mentally ill to influence its decision.281 In its decision, the Norton
276 See Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053 (no judicial review of the CIA under the APA); Neely
v. CIA, 27 FEP Cases 82, 85 (D.D.C. 1982) (no Merit System Protection Board review of the
CIA under the CSRA), aff 'd 744 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,' 471 U.S. 1022 (1985).
See Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053; Neely, 27 FEP Cases at 85; Rhodes v. United States,
156 Ct. Cl. 31, 36 (1962).
2" In Webster, the Court held that a serious constitutional question would arise if the
Court construed a statute to deny a colorable constitutional claim. Webster, 108 S. Ct. at 2053.
2" See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Beller v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); Norton v. Macy, 417
F.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
28" See Padula, 822 F.2d at 104; Beller, 632 F.2d at 811.
5'" Norton, 417 F.2d at 1166.
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court incorrectly agreed that homosexuals detract from the effi-
ciency of their employer because they fail to demonstrate character,
stability and responsibility.282 By holding that homosexuals lack the
stability to hold certain types of federal government employment,
the Norton court demonstrated that courts recognize inaccurate ste-
reotypes of homosexuals as valid.
The Norton court also identified another way in which homo-
sexuals present a threat to the efficiency of a government agency.
According to the Norton court, homosexuals represent a potential
security leak due to their susceptibility to blackmail. 283 This new
justification contains a severe logical flaw, however. The Norton court
ignored the fact that the federal government must first discover an
employee's homosexual orientation before it can fire the employee
due to his susceptibility to blackmail. Potential blackmailers might
have leverage over secretive homosexuals; however, it is not secre-
tive homosexuals that the government dismisses as a potential target
for blackmail. The government only dismisses known homosexual
employees as potential blackmail targets, not those homosexuals that
actually are blackmail targets. Prospective blackmailers have no lev-
erage over an employee whose sexual orientation is known to the
government. When formulating the thesis that homosexuals present
potential targets for blackmail, the court of appeals allowed its
personal prejudices to interfere with its powers of logical reasoning.
Using similarly flawed logic, in Beller v. Middendorf, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit allowed society's
prejudice toward homosexuals to defeat a due process challenge. 284
In Beller, writing for the majority, Judge (now Justice) Kennedy
agreed that a Naval regulation which discriminates against homo-
sexuals has a rational relationship to the compelling government
interest of military discipline because many Navy personnel main-
tain prejudices against homosexuals, which creates tension and hos-
tility in the ranks and impairs a homosexual's ability to command
respect. 285 Through the majority holding, Judge Kennedy allowed
the military to codify society's prejudice against homosexuals in its
regulations. Judge Kennedy seemed to ignore, however, the fact
that many member's of society also maintain prejudices toward
282 Id.;; see Siegelman, Kinsey and Others: Empirical Input in MALE AND FEMALE HOMOSEX-
UALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES 44 (L. Diamant ed. 1987).
2" Norton, 417 F2d at 1166.
2  See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788,811-12 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
905 (1981).
2" Id.
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blacks and women. According to Judge Kennedy's rationale, the
Navy could also promulgate regulations discharging all blacks and
women because such a regulation has a rational relationship to the
compelling interest of military discipline, due to the fact that bigoted
enlisted personnel might fail to obey a black or female officer.
Certainly, Judge Kennedy had no intention of justifying a racist or
sexist regulation through his holding in Beller; however, in his zeal
to find a compelling government interest that outweighs the height-
ened scrutiny merited by private homosexual conduct, Judge Ken-
nedy allowed his powers of logic to lapse.
Even beyond the flawed logic of Beller and Norton, in Padula v.
Webster, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia demon-
strated its willingness to stretch logic to its limits in order to permit
the FBI to discriminate against homosexuals. 286
 The Padula court
held that the FBI could discriminate against homosexuals due to
the fact that public dislike renders homosexuals susceptible to black-
mail to protect themselves or their partners. 287 Thus, the Padula court
expanded the blackmail argument that it had previously made in
Norton. Perhaps the Padula court believed it remedied the logical
flaw in the blackmail argument by pointing out that potential black-
mailers could still obtain leverage over a federal government em-
ployee even if the federal government knew of the employee's
orientation, because the employee's partner may still maintain se-
crecy about her sexual orientation. This argument assumes, how-
ever, that the partner also keeps her sexual orientation a secret, not
always a valid assumption. Additionally, the argument seems to
assume that only homosexuals present potential targets for black-
mailers; whereas, in reality blackmailers can obtain equal leverage
against heterosexual adulterers who wish to protect themselves or
their partners. Therefore, in attempting to salvage the blackmail
argument by expanding its scope, the Padula court unintentionally
included an invalid premise.
Perhaps knowing of the faulty reasoning used by the courts
that had handed down decisions in this area, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted homosexuals sus-
pect class status in Watkins v. U.S. Army.'" As a result, the court
used the strict scrutiny standard in reviewing the Army's justifica-
288 See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
287 Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
288 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
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tions for discharging homosexuals. 289 Under the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, the government regulation must be necessary for the achieve-
ment of a permissible state objective. 290 According to the Watkins
court, none of the Army's rationales bore a close relation to a
compelling government interest. 29 ' The Watkins court identified the
logical flaws in both the prejudice argument as used earlier by the
same court in Beller and the blackmail argument as advanced in
Norton. Due to the errors in logic contained in the two arguments
supported by earlier courts, the Watkins court correctly pointed out
that neither justification is tailored narrowly enough to overcome
strict scrutiny.292 When applying a strict scrutiny analysis to Army
regulations that discriminate against homosexuals, the Watkins court
carefully considered the logic behind each of the Army's justifica-
tions for the regulations. As a result, the Watkins court granted the
plaintiff relief on the basis of his constitutional claims.
Thus, the courts' acceptance of arguments advanced by the
federal government to justify discrimination against homosexuals
reveals their determination to deny homosexuals constitutional re-
lief. If the courts became a little less anxious to accept the federal
government's rationales as valid, the courts might realize that ste-
reotypes and flawed logic form the basis for the blackmail argument
in Padula and the prejudice argument in Beller. Upon granting
homosexuals suspect class status, the Watkins court carefully scruti-
nized the federal government's reasons for discriminating against
homosexuals and discovered the flaws. 293 No other court uses the
strict scrutiny standard, however, thereby permitting flawed justi-
fications for discrimination to obtain precedential value.
As indicated in Beller, courts acknowledge that discrimination
against homosexuals merits some form of heightened scrutiny. 294
Additionally, the Watkins court granted homosexuals suspect class
status and thereby reviewed discriminations under a strict scrutiny
standard. 295 Under either the strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny
standard, a compelling state interest must justify any federal gov-
ernment regulation that discriminates against homosexuals. 296
252 Id.
290
	
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
291 Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1349.
292 Id. at 1352.
225 Id. at 1350-52.
294 See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981).
2" Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1349.
296 Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1349 (court held that in order to pass the strict scrutiny test, a
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Courts recognize that national security, especially foreign intelli-
gence, represents a very compelling state interest. 297 The courts
demonstrate extreme deference to the intelligence agencies by al-
lowing an intelligence agency to abridge constitutional rights on its
unilateral decision that national security justifies its actions. 298 Gen-
erally, the courts hold spies in high regard and permit them to do
whatever they believe national security requires.
In Snepp v. United States, a case dealing with national security
in a slightly different context, the United States Supreme Court
established that national security comprises a compelling state in-
, terest. 299 More specifically, the Snepp Court correctly held that the
compelling state interest of national security includes the protection
of CIA information sources and methods.30° In the later holding of
CIA v. Sims, however, the United States Supreme Court established
that anything having to do with the CIA by definition meant na-
tional security. 30 ' The Sims Court held that the protection of any
information possessed by the Agency, even the magazines to which
it subscribed, represents a compelling state interest. 302
 If the CIA
alleges that a homosexual employee can expose any information
about the Agency whatsoever, perhaps as little as the titles of the
magazines in the CIA's waiting room, then the Agency can dem-
onstrate to a reviewing court that the employee's dismissal furthers
a compelling state interest.
In addition to acknowledging that national security constitutes
a compelling state interest, the courts also require that the agency's
action bears a close relationship to protection of national security. 303
Korematsu v. United States demonstrates that, in the arena of national
security, the courts uphold a federal government agency's deter-
mination that a close relationship exists between its actions and the
regulation must further a compelling government interest); Beller, 632 F.2d at 810 (court
held that the importance of the government interest furthered is a factor in deciding whether
a regulation outweighs the heightened scrutiny granted to homosexuals).
2" CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985).
296 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (court relied on the judgment
of the military authorities that their actions were necessary to protect the national security).
295 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
'"c) Id.; see also McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (court stated that
CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner testified that the revelation of information sources
in ex-CIA agent McGehee's article made several information sources "nervous").
5°1 See Sins, 471 U.S. at 176-77.
5°2 See id.
3" See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds,
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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national security. 304 In Korematsu, the United States Supreme Court
deferred to the questionable judgment of the military authorities
that the Japanese-American population of the west coast contained
disloyal members and no method existed to separate disloyal from
loyal citizens. 3" In McGehee v. Casey, however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia questioned the prac-
tice of granting total deference to the opinion of the Agency.'" The
McGehee court correctly stated that despite the CIA's duty to protect
the national security, the judiciary must protect individuals rights."'
Should a court that is reviewing the CIA's dismissal of a homosexual
employee under section 102(c) choose to take the same approach
as the McGehee court, then it will make sure that the reasons listed
by the Agency for dismissing the employee are rationally and logi-
cally related to national security.'" In contrast, if that same court
instead chooses to use the Korematsu method, then the CIA only
needs to assert that its actions are necessary to protect the confi-
dentiality of national security in formation. 3°9
Like the Supreme Court's Korematsu opinion, the opinion of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Truong
demonstrates that the courts trust the executive to exercise good
faith in foreign policy decisions. 30 The Truong court allowed the
FBI to conduct warrantless searches, based upon the Bureau's as-
surance that these searches further the national security. 3 " Unlike
the courts, Congress recognized the potential for abuse in this sys-
tem and subsequently to the Truong opinion, passed the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. 312 Although Congress wished to con-
tinue the legitimate use of warrantless searches for national security
purposes, it also sought to curb violations of citizens' fourth amend-
ment rights, which the executive could justify merely by making the
assertion that national security necessitated the searches. 3 " Unless
3°4 Karemaisu, 323 U.S. at 218.
3°5 Id.
306 See McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
so McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1149.
"8 See ed. at 1148-49.
309 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
310 See generally United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
3 " Truang, 629 F.2d at 915.
312 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (1982). See supra note 229 for the text of the relevant section
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
3" United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting S. REP.
No. 604 95th Cong. 2nd Sess., pt. 1 at 7 (1977)), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Congress passes a similar piece of legislation regarding the CIA
Director's powers under section 102(c) of the National Security Act,
courts will continue to defer to the Director's judgment that CIA
employment practices regarding homosexuals further the protec-
tion of classified information.
The courts agree that national security represents a compelling
state interests" Additionally, courts defer to the judgment of ex-
ecutive agencies that their actions bear a close relationship to na-
tional security." 5 Thus, a court can find that discrimination against
a homosexual by the CIA bears a close relationship to the further-
ance of a compelling state interest based solely on the assurances of
the CIA. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act curbed the
abuses perpetrated by the executive under the foreign intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement. Unless Congress passes some
statute, similar to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which
curbs the potential for Agency abuse under section 102(c) the CIA
can continue to fire homosexuals based on its own findings that
homosexuals represent a threat to national security.
C. justice Scalia's Dissent in Webster v. Doe
Should the courts choose to follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit
in Watkins and grant homosexuals suspect class status, then the
compelling state interest represented by the security of classified
information might not satisfy the strict scrutiny standard." 6 As a
result, a homosexual stands a chance of successfully challenging his
or her dismissal from the CIA under fifth amendment equal pro-
tection principles. The CIA Director, however, still has ammunition
at his or her disposal to defeat homosexuals' claims of employment
discrimination. The courts' hostility towards homosexuals, as evi-
denced by their willingness to accept the federal government's jus-
tifications for discharging homosexuals as rational, might lead the
courts to adopt Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which denies judicial review of all of the employ-
314 See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507, 509 n.3 (1980)).
"s See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
313 In Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that only apprehension by the
proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety could consti-
tutionally justify discrimination against a single racial group. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218
(1944).
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ment decisions made by the Director under section 102(c) of the
National Security Act. 3 "
In his dissent in Webster v. Doe, Justice Scalia analyzed section
701(a)(2) of the APA, which denies judicial review under the Act to
all agency actions committed to agency discretion by law. 3 " Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia's reading of section 701(a)(2), it exempts all
agency actions of the sort that the courts traditionally refuse to
review from judicial scrutiny under the terms of the APA. 319 As
examples of the sort of issues that are traditionally beyond judicial
review, Justice Scalia identified political questions, sovereign im-
munity, and official immunity, among others. 3" Justice Scalia's in7
terpretation runs counter to the United States Supreme Court's
previous decisions interpreting section 701(a)(2) as denying judicial
review where Congress wrote the statute governing the situation in
such a broad manner that a court has no meaningful standards
against which to judge the agency's action. 3" Unlike the Court's
previous holdings regarding the scope of section 701(a)(2), Justice
Scalia's interpretation of the Act permits a reviewing court to use
legal precedents for guidance as to whether the action is exempt
from judicial review under the APA. If those legal precedents state
that the action is of the type which courts traditionally refuse to
review,322 then the courts should not review the action under the
APA, even if it is a constitutional claim.
On the other hand, the majority's interpretation of section
701(a)(2) permits a court to deny review where it finds no standard
to judge the agency's actions. 323 Thus, a reviewing court may choose
to find no standards in a statute that might in fact provide some
guidance. For example, in Webster the Court chose to find no stan-
dard in section 102(c) even though the statute states that the dis-
missal must advance the interest of national defense. 324
 Under Jus-
tice Scalia's interpretation, however, precedent decides whether the
challenge to agency action involves a traditionally unreviewable
"7 Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2060 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51 ° Id. at 2057 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2056 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'' Id. at 2052; see also, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
522 See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text for a. discussion of the types of actions
which the courts traditionally refuse to review.
'2' See, e.g., Heckler, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
"4
 Webster, l08 S. Ct. at 2052.
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agency action and should therefore not be reviewed by a court. 326
Justice Scalia's reading of section 701(a)(2) provides the reviewing
courts with more guidance than the majority's standard, although
using justice Scalia's standard would guide more courts toward
denying review. Using the interpretation of section 701(a)(2) ad-
vanced by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Webster, a court would
exempt an agency's actions from judicial review under the APA if
legal precedents established the action as one which the courts
traditionally decline to review. Thus, although using Justice Scalia's
standard would provide more certainty, it would also deny consti-
tutional review if the action is of the type which the courts have
traditionally declined to review.
Unfortunately, the employment decisions of the CIA represent
the type of agency actions which courts traditionally refuse to re-
view. In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., the United States Supreme
Court held that the Constitution commits the conduct of foreign
relations to the executive and legislative branches of the govern-
ment. 326
 This holding, coupled with the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Gilligan v. Morgan, which demonstrated that a
Constitutional grant of power to one branch of the federal govern-
ment prevented the judiciary from reviewing the exercise of that
power, establishes that the CIA's actions are of the type which the
courts traditionally refuse to review. 327
 The Court's holding in Gil-
ligan also demonstrated that when a branch of the federal govern-
ment has expertise in making the kind of decision that a plaintiff
wishes to review, a court defers to the judgment of the experts. 328
Courts already acknowledge the expertise of the CIA in the area of
foreign intelligence. Thus, the CIA's decisions about the conduct
of their intelligence gathering activities embody the type of actions
that courts traditionally refuse to review due to lack of expertise.
Should the courts wish to permit the CIA to continue to dis-
criminate against homosexuals, or anyone for that matter, then
Justice Scalia's interpretation of section 701(a)(2) of the APA pro-
vides the court with a method. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in
Webster denies judicial review under section 701(a)(2) if the courts
traditionally refused to review the agency action in question: 329
525 Id. at 2057 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co„ 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
527 Sre Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, 6 (1973); see also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549, 554 (1946).
328 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10.
3" Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2057 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Although Justice Scalia's interpretation provides a much less sub-
jective standard to the courts, it permits the CIA to engage in
wholesale discrimination in its employment practices. If the courts
continue to demonstrate their admiration for the CIA and also
maintain their dislike for homosexuals, then they may resort to
Justice Scalia's interpretation of the APA to permit their favorite
agency's discrimination against homosexuals despite the grant of a
suspect class to homosexuals.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unless the courts change their attitudes about both homosex-
uals and the CIA, then a homosexual plaintiff has no chance of
successfully challenging his dismissal from the Agency. Courts re-
vealed their dislike for homosexuals by failing to hold in favor of
homosexuals raising constitutional challenges to the loss of their
employment with the federal government. The courts based these
rulings on stereotypes of homosexuals as unstable, society's preju-
dice toward homosexuals, and the logically flawed argument that
homosexuals might reveal sensitive information through blackmail.
Until the courts recognize these bases as illegitimate, the federal
government can continue to discriminate against homosexuals.
The courts reflect their positive attitude about the CIA in their
holdings which permit the Agency to protect all information in its
possession. The courts must realize that they are responsible for
the protection of individual rights in this country. In order to ex-
ercise this responsibility properly, the courts must determine that
on occasion, individual rights outweigh the protection of certain
information possessed by the Agency. Until the courts begin to
regard the CIA with less reverence, a homosexual has only a small
chance of successfully challenging his or her dismissal by the
Agency. Congress can provide CIA employees with some protection
from the absolute employment discretion of the CIA Director by
modifying section I 02(c) of the National Security Act to provide a
reviewing court with some standards against which to judge the
Director's discretion. Until either Congress or the courts take action,
however, the CIA Director can fire homosexual employees at will.
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